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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(k) (Supp. 1992).

ISSUE ON APPEAL
The issue presented by this appeal is:

Can these

California Defendants, who have no contacts with Utah, be
subjected to personal jurisdiction in Utah merely because the
Plaintiff has relocated from California to Utah, and now
alleges that the California

Defendants committed

against

they

the

authorities

Plaintiff
certain

when

criminal

reported

acts

that

a tort

to

California

the

Plaintiff

perpetrated in California before she relocated to Utah?
This

issue

involves

the

review

of

a

pretrial

jurisdictional decision made on documentary evidence only.
Accordingly, the District Court's decision is reviewed for
correctness. Arauello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co..
838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992).

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE8, RULES. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This appeal is governed by the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and by Utah's long-arm statute which reads:
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who
in person or through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual,
his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this
state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this
state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state
whether tortious or by breach of warranty;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS
Valerie Bryant ("Plaintiff") sued Lon Morton, Michael

Landau, Morton Capital Management, The Morton Company, Inc.,
and

California

Capital

Services, Inc.

(collectively the

"California Defendants") in the Third District Court for Salt
Lake

County.

Plaintiff

alleged

claims

for

malicious

prosecution and defamation.
The California Defendants moved the District Court to
dismiss based on the Court's lack of personal jurisdiction.
The District Court, Honorable Judge James Sawaya, determined
that the California Defendants' Fourteenth Amendment rights to
due process would be violated by the assertion of personal
2

jurisdiction over them in Utah. Based on that conclusion, the
District Court dismissed, and Plaintiff appeals.

II.

FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL
The facts for purposes of this appeal are to be taken

from the affidavits of Lon Morton and Michael Landau (attached
hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively).

lf

[T]he facts

recited in the complaint are considered only to the extent
that they do not contradict the affidavit[s]." Arauello v.
Industrial Woodworking Machine Co.. 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah
1992) .

The facts have thus been established as set forth

below.
Defendants Lon Morton and Michael Landau are citizens
and residents of California.

Neither of them has ever been a

resident of Utah. They have never owned property in Utah and
have never done business in Utah.
("Exhibit A") 1

[Affidavit of Lon Morton

2, at 1,; Affidavit

of Michael

Landau

("Exhibit B") J 2, at 2].
Lon Morton is the majority shareholder of the three
corporate

defendants

in

this

action:

Morton

Capital

Management, The Morton Company, Inc., and California Capital
Services,

Inc.

(collectively

[Exhibit A f 1, at 1].

the

"Morton

Companies").

The Morton Companies

are all

California corporations with their collective principal place
of business in California. None of the Morton Companies have
ever done business in Utah. They have no property or clients
3

in Utah, maintain no offices in Utah, have never contracted to
provide goods or services in Utah, and do not purchase goods
or services from any persons or entities in Utah.

[Exhibit A

II 3, at 2].
In short, none of the California Defendants have any
contacts with Utah.
In

April

1989,

Plaintiff,

then

a

resident

of

California, was hired by Lon Morton to be the Controller for
the Morton Companies.

[Exhibit A J 4, at 2].

Plaintiff

continued her employment with the Companies until the end of
February 1990, at which time she resigned and moved to Utah.
[Exhibit A 1 7, at 2].
Before

Plaintiff

left

California

at

the

end

of

February 1990, Lon Morton requested that Plaintiff continue to
provide consulting services to the Morton Companies in order
to aid the Morton Companies in making the transition to a new
Controller.

[Exhibit

California,

Plaintiff

assistance.

[Id.]

A

J

8,

agreed
Plaintiff

at
to

3].

While

provide

then moved

the

still

in

requested

to Utah, but

continued to consult with Companies until approximately May
1990.

[Exhibit A J 10, at 3].
All

the Morton

Companies' computer

equipment and

software, on which Plaintiff relied to do her work, were
located at the Morton Companies' offices. [Exhibit A f 11, at
3].

The Morton Companies and Plaintiff understood from the

outset that Plaintiff's continued assistance to the Companies
4

after

February

California.

1990

would

necessarily

be

performed

in

The California Defendants never requested that

Plaintiff provide services in Utah.

Consequently, Plaintiff

commuted to California frequently during the period from March
through May of 1990 and assisted the Morton Companies there.
[Exhibit A fl 11, at 3].
After

Plaintiff's

relationship

with

the

Morton

Companies ended, the California Defendants discovered that,
during her time with the Morton Companies, Plaintiff had used
a company-owned credit card extensively to purchase items for
her personal use. [Exhibit A J 12, at 3].

Such company-owned

credit cards were to be used only for company business
expenses.

[Id. f 5, at 2].

As the California Defendants

scrutinized Plaintiff's use of the cards more closely, they
found that Plaintiff had used her position within the Morton
Companies to prevent others from discovering her embezzlement,
fid. 5 12, at 3].

Plaintiff wrote and signed checks from the

Morton Companies' accounts to pay the credit card balance each
month without any review or oversight.

[Id.]

When the management of the Morton Companies learned of
Plaintiff's misuse of the credit cards, Lon Morton complained
to

law

enforcement

California.

officials

[Id. J 13, at 4].

in

Los

Angeles

County,

Plaintiff was later charged in

Los Angeles County with criminal theft. [Complaint ("Exhibit
C") J 9, at 3].

Because Plaintiff had moved to Utah, Los

5

Angeles County

law enforcement officials necessarily had

Plaintiff arrested in Utah.
In

her

Complaint,

Plaintiff

alleges

that

the

California Defendants' reports to Los Angeles County law
enforcement officials were false, and that the California
Defendants have initiated a malicious prosecution against her.
Putting aside for the moment this claim's utter lack of merit,
it is clear that Plaintiff chose the wrong forum in which seek
relief.

The District Court was correct in deciding that the

California Defendants cannot constitutionally be subjected to
personal jurisdiction in Utah.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff seeks redress in Utah against California
Defendants who have no contacts with Utah.

In order to

establish

constraints,

jurisdiction

within

due

process

Plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the California
Defendants purposefully directed their acts toward the State
of Utah. The California Defendants have not so directed their
actions.
The

California

Defendants

never

published

any

statement to any person in Utah, nor did they seek the
assistance of any Utah officials.
Defendants

complained

to

Instead, the California

law enforcement

authorities

in

California about criminal actions perpetrated by the Plaintiff
in California while she was still a resident of California.
6

Plaintiff

has

argued

that

because

she

became a

resident of Utah shortly before the California Defendants
complained of her conduct, it was foreseeable that she would
suffer an injury in Utah.

Under the Supreme Court's due

process analysis, however, this brand of foreseeability is not
sufficient to create the necessary minimum contacts. Contacts
must be viewed from the defendant's perspective and must be
analyzed to determine not whether some effect was foreseeable,
but whether the defendant

intentionally

directed his actions toward the forum.

and purposefully

Only then should the

defendant "reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the
forum state."

If the defendant did not purposefully direct

his acts toward the state, and his contacts are merely
"fortuitous" or the result of the "unilateral conduct" of
another, then minimum contacts do not exist to establish
jurisdiction.
In this case, the California Defendants' only arguable
contact with Utah arises from their report to California
authorities that Plaintiff embezzled from the Morton Companies
while in California. The fact that Plaintiff chose to move to
Utah

shortly

after

committing

a

crime,

thus

requiring

California authorities to find her in Utah, does not subject
the California Defendants to jurisdiction here.
presence

in Utah was not

Plaintiff's

the choice of the California

Defendants, nor was it the focus of their actions. Plaintiff
could have taken herself to any state and would eventually
7

have been arrested there.

But which state she was in would

have made no difference to the California Defendants.

The

California Defendants' contacts in Utah were thus "fortuitous"
and the result of "unilateral" activity by the Plaintiff.
Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that it
lacked personal jurisdiction over the California Defendants.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiff wants to sue the California Defendants in
Utah despite their utter lack of contacts with Utah and
despite Utah's lack of interest in the controversy.

As the

following pages demonstrate, the District Court correctly
concluded

that

a

Utah

court

cannot

assert

personal

jurisdiction over the California Defendants consistent with
due process.

I.

THE FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL MUST BE
TAKEN FROM THE AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY THE
CALIFORNIA DEFENDANTS.
In any action, the plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing facts on which jurisdiction can be based.

See

Tavlor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 431 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Behaaen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731,
733 (10th Cir. 1984) ; Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic
Surgeons. 807 P. 2d 825, 827

(Utah 1990)

(adopting Tenth

Circuit's guidelines for making pretrial determinations of
personal jurisdiction and citing with approval Behaaen). When
8

a defendant brings a motion to dismiss and supports the motion
with an affidavit setting forth the defendant's version of the
jurisdictional facts, the plaintiff cannot merely rest on the
allegations of the complaint.

If the plaintiff does not

controvert the defendant's affidavit, "the facts asserted in
the affidavit are taken as true and the facts recited in the
complaint are considered only to the extent that they do not
contradict the affidavit." Arauello v. Industrial Woodworking
Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992).
We think that a mechanism
for determining
jurisdiction prior to a trial on the merits, analogous to
the mechanism available for summary judgment, Rule 56(e),
comports with fairness and due process, and hence that
allegations in a complaint should not be able to
withstand the force of specific allegations of fact in
affidavit form which latter allegations are not
challenged.
Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco. Inc.. 610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah
1980).
In this case, the California Defendants submitted the
affidavits of Defendants Lon Morton and Michael Landau, which
set forth facts demonstrating a complete lack of contacts
between the California Defendants and the State of Utah. [See
Exhibits A and B]. Because Plaintiff did not challenge those
facts, they are to be taken as true for purposes of this
appeal.

9

II.
A.

THE CALIFORNIA DEFENDANTS CANNOT
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN UTAH.

BE SUBJECTED TO

Personal Jurisdiction May be Exercised Only Where
Due Process Considerations are Satisfied.
Under Utah's "long-arm" statute, nonresidents submit

themselves to jurisdiction by "the causing of any injury
within this state."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(3) (Supp.

1992) . Based on that language, Plaintiff theorizes that her
allegation
automatically
jurisdiction

of

malicious
subjects

by

reason

prosecution

the
of

in

California

an

"injury"

California

Defendants
caused

to

in Utah.

However, the scope of Utah's long-arm statute does not frame
the critical inquiry.

As the Utah Supreme Court has stated,

the Utah long-arm statute should be construed to extend the
jurisdiction of Utah courts "to the fullest extent allowed by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution." Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching
Co. , 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985).

Thus, the critical

inquiry is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the California Defendants violates due process.
Under due process analysis, personal jurisdiction is
valid

only where the defendant

has established

"certain

minimum contacts with the [the forum state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.'"

International Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Mever. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also Parry v. Ernst
10

Home

Center

Corp.,

779

P.2d

659,

662

(Utah

1989).

Accordingly, the defendant's "conduct and connection with the
forum state [must be] such that
anticipate

being

haled

into

[they] should reasonably

court

there."

World

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

Wide
"To

establish minimum contacts, a defendant must 'purposefully
avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of
its laws.'"

American Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. First

American Title Co. of Utah. 772 F. Supp. 574, 577 (D. Utah
1991) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
"This

'purposeful

availment'

requirement

ensures

that a

defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, or
of the 'unilateral activity of another party or a third
person.'"

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474

(1985) (citations omitted).

B.

The California Defendants Cannot be Subjected to
Jurisdiction Unless they Purposefully Directed Their
Actions Toward Utah.
Plaintiff urges that jurisdiction is valid in this

case because: (1) the California Defendants' alleged actions
affected a Utah resident, and (2) the California Defendants
knew that Plaintiff lived in Utah and could foresee an effect
in Utah.

In support of her "effects" analysis, Plaintiff

relies on Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 787 (1984) and Keeton v.
11

Hustler

Magazine,

Inc.

465

U.S. 770

(1984),

in which

defamatory materials published in the forum by out-of-state
defendants were held to establish sufficient minimum contacts.
By relying on Calder and Keeton. however, Plaintiff fails to
recognize the true import of the Supreme Court's minimum
contacts analysis.
The Supreme Court's discussion of "effects" in Calder
cannot be read to mean that any effect caused in the forum
state creates minimum contacts.

A proper reading of the

Supreme Court's jurisdiction decisions reveals a functional
analysis that focuses not on the mere existence of some
contacts, but rather on the nature and quality of those
contacts.

Thus, "[t]he Court long ago rejected the notion

that personal jurisdiction might turn on 'mechanical' tests."
Burger King Co.. 471 U.S. at 478.

A defendant who merely

causes an effect in the forum state does not necessarily
establish minimum contacts.
The Seventh Circuit has aptly synthesized Calder and
its "effects" language into the whole of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction analysis as follows:
We do not believe the that the Supreme Court, in Calder,
was saying that any plaintiff may hale any defendant into
court in the plaintiff's home state, where the defendant
has no contacts, merely by asserting that the defendant
has committed an intentional tort against the plaintiff.
As the Supreme Court explained in fBurger King Corp.1
(decided after Calder), "the constitutional touchstone
remains whether the defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts in the forum state."
Wallace v. Herron. 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1985).
12

The foreseeabilitv of an effect on the forum also
fails to establish minimum contacts.

The Supreme Court

articulated this reasoning as follows:
Although it has been argued that foreseeability of
causing injury in another State should be sufficient to
establish such contacts there when policy considerations
so require, the Court has consistently held that this
kind of foreseeability is not a "sufficient benchmark"
for exercising personal jurisdiction,
World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S., at 295, 100 S.Ct.,
at 566. Instead, "the foreseeability that is critical to
due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there." Id. at 297, 100 S.Ct., at 567.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
Thus,

it

is

the

purposeful

direction

of

one's

activities toward the forum state, not simply the resulting
effects or their foreseeability, that creates the requisite
contacts.

Only through such purposeful direction can the

defendant "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in
the forum state.

C.

The California Defendants Did Not Direct Their
Actions
Toward
Utah
When
They
Reported
Plaintiff's Crimes to California Authorities.
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that the California

Defendants knew of Plaintiff's residence in Utah when they
reported her crimes in California. Indeed, Plaintiff attempts
to analogize this case to Calder. by pointing out that Calder,
like the present

case, involved

allegations of wrongful

statements made out of state that caused injury in the state.
Plaintiff's comparison is misplaced. Unlike the present case,

the defendants in Calder actually published the allegedly
defamatory statements in the forum state.
U.S. at 785.

See Calder, 465

The Calder defendants clearly directed their

activities toward the forum state.1
In contrast, the California Defendants in this case
never

directed

discovered

the

their

actions

Plaintiff's

toward

Utah.

embezzlement,

the

When

they

California

Defendants reported the fact of the embezzlement to California
authorities. The California Defendants made their report with
the (correct) expectation that the matter would be handled by
California

authorities

in

the

California

court

system.

Although it was foreseeable that Plaintiff might be affected
in Utah, Utah was not the focal point of the California
Defendants' actions. The California Defendants did not enlist
the assistance of Utah authorities or publish any statements
regarding

Plaintiff

to

anyone

in Utah.

In short,

the

California Defendants did not concern themselves with Utah.

1

Plaintiff relies on a number of other cases that are
distinguishable for the same reason. See Brainerd v. Governors of
the Univ. of Alberta. 873 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1989) (defamation
case in which defendant directed defamatory remarks toward persons
in forum state) ; Burt v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Nebraska,
757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1985) (same); Lake v. Lake. 817 F.2d 1416
(9th Cir. 1987) (attorney misled California court in procuring
order intended to be taken and used by client to enlist Idaho
authorities in wrongful action); Simon v. United States. 644 F.2d
490 (5th Cir. 1980) (attorney prepared and directed invalid
subpoena to officials in forum state resulting in plaintiff's
arrest); Duke v. Young, 496 So.2d 37 (Ala. 1986) (defendants
allegedly directed fraudulent statement toward plaintiff in forum
state).
14

Plaintiff's presence in Utah was not the choice of the
California Defendants nor was it their focus. Plaintiff could
have located herself in Hawaii or Alabama and it would have
made no difference to the California Defendants.
would eventually have been arrested somewhere.

Plaintiff

And the mere

reporting of criminal activity by the Plaintiff in California,
which report foreseeably and eventually resulted in her arrest
elsewhere, cannot be considered to establish minimum contacts
in any state where Plaintiff unilaterally chooses to reside.
A defendant's behavior toward the forum state must be more
substantial than that, such as in Calder and Keeton. where the
defendants directed their libelous statements into the forum
state and published them there.

The California Defendants'

contacts with Utah are, in words of the Supreme Court,
"fortuitous" and arise from the "unilateral activity" of the
Plaintiff, who happened to move to Utah after committing
crimes in California.

D.

Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474.

Personal Jurisdiction Cases that Have Involved
the Use of Legal Process Support the District
Court's
Determination
that the California
Defendants Lack Minimum Contacts.
Plaintiff attempts to analogize this case to other

cases in which the defendants abused judicial process in the
forum state thereby establishing minimum contacts.

See Lake

v. Lake, 817 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1987); Simon v. United States,
644 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1981).

Examining, as this Court must,

15

the nature and quality of the contacts involved in Lake and
Simon shows that both cases are distinguishable from this one.
In Lake, an attorney misled a California court in
obtaining an ex parte order regarding the custody of a child
who was located in Idaho. The attorney failed to disclose to
the California court that the child had lived in Idaho for at
least sixteen months, thereby making Idaho the correct state
for jurisdiction over the child's custody determination. See
Lake, 817 F.2d at 1419.

The attorney nevertheless obtained

the ex parte order from the California court and gave the
order to his client with the intent that the client would use
the order to secure the assistance of Idaho authorities to
gain custody of the child.

The Ninth Circuit held that the

attorney was subject to jurisdiction in Idaho based on his
actions.

Id. at 1423.

Critical to the Ninth Circuit's

decision was the fact that the attorney "intended a foreign
act, obtaining the California ex parte order, to have an
effect in the forum state of Idaho."

Id.

In Simon, an attorney practicing in Georgia was held
to have established minimum

contacts in Louisiana.

The

Georgia attorney drafted a subpoena to be served on the
plaintiff
careless

in Louisiana.
errors

The attorney had made several

in drafting

the

subpoena,

including

an

incorrect name and address. See Simon, 644 F.2d at 492. The
plaintiff was never served as a result.

When the plaintiff

did not appear to testify in Georgia as the erroneous subpoena
16

demanded, the defendant attorney told the Georgia court that
the plaintiff had been served and was avoiding compliance with
the subpoena•

Jd.

Consequently, the Georgia court issued a

warrant that resulted in the arrest of the plaintiff.

The

plaintiff sued the Georgia attorney in Louisiana, and the
Fifth Circuit held that jurisdiction was valid.

Once again,

the key to the Fifth Circuit's decision was that the Georgia
attorney drafted an erroneous subpoena and directed that the
subpoena be issued by Louisiana officials on a Louisiana
plaintiff.

Thus, the actions of the Georgia attorney were

directed at the forum state.
Lake and Simon are distinguishable from the present
case because they both involved the use of legal process
specifically directed at the forum states at issue.

In both

cases, the defendants necessarily reached out to the forum
states and caused false written materials to be used there.
Accordingly, Lake and Simon are similar to Calder in the sense
that the defendants made the forum states the intended focus
of their actions.

In contrast, the California Defendants in

this case never published any statements to Utah residents or
officials,
authorities.

and

never

enlisted

the

assistance

of

Utah

The arrest of Plaintiff in Utah occurred, at

best, indirectly and only at the discretion of Los Angeles
County

law

enforcement

officials.

Consequently,

the

California Defendants' contacts with Utah are fundamentally

17

different

in their nature and quality than the contacts

involved in Lake and Simon.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit

followed

this same reasoning

in concluding that

jurisdiction did not exist in a case indistinguishable from
this one. See Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir.
1985).

In Wallace, the plaintiff, an Indiana resident, filed

a suit for malicious prosecution in Indiana against several
California residents. The basis for the plaintiff's claim was
that the defendants had maliciously initiated a lawsuit in
California against the plaintiff.

See Wallace, 778 F.2d at

392-93.
When

the

defendants

objected

to

jurisdiction

in

Indiana, the plaintiff argued that the prosecution of the
earlier case by defendants against plaintiff, although filed
in California,

had

caused

him

injury

in Indiana.

The

plaintiff pointed out that the defendants had established
minimum contacts with Indiana because, during the alleged
malicious

prosecution

in

California,

they

"served

interrogatories, requested the production of documents, and
caused plaintiff to respond to five complaints in Indiana
where the plaintiff resides." Id. at 394. In so arguing, the
plaintiff relied on Calder, in which the Supreme Court held
that two Florida residents were subject to jurisdiction in
California when they authored

a libelous article in The

National Enquirer and circulated it in California.
18

The Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument and
his reliance on Calder as follows:
The defendants' contacts with Indiana in this case
are significantly more attenuated than the Calder
defendants' contacts with California. In Calder. the
suit grew out of an article about the California
activities of a California resident whose career was
centered in California. The defendants relied primarily
on California sources in writing the article. 104 S.Ct.
at 1486-87. California was the focal point both of the
story and any harm suffered.
The harm was uniquely
related to California because the emotional distress and
injury to professional reputation suffered by the
plaintiff were primarily a result of the publication of
the story to California residents. Id. Calder on its
facts is sharply distinguishable from this malicious
prosecution case, where the defendants' only arguable
contacts with Indiana were the legal papers which were
served on [the plaintiff] in Indiana.
Wallace, 778 F.2d at 395.
Looking carefully at the intent and direction of the
California Defendants' actions, the California Defendants'
contacts with Utah are similar to the contacts held to be
insufficient

in Wallace.

They

are

not

the

result

of

purposeful and intentional direction toward Utah and are not
sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the California
Defendants.

E.

Fairness Considerations Also Arcrue
Exercise of Jurisdiction in Utah.

Against

the

Other fairness considerations also militate against
jurisdiction in this case.

As the Supreme Court stated in

Burger King Corp., even if the defendant has established
minimum contacts with the forum state, those "contacts may be
considered in light of other factors to determine whether the

assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair
play and substantial justice.'"

Burger King Corp.. 471 U.S.

at 476.
Thus, courts in "appropriate case[s]" may evaluate "the
burden on the defendant," "the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief," "the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies," and the
"shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies."
Id. at 476-77 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
The "fairness" factors outlined in Burger King Corp.
argue against the exercise of jurisdiction over the California
Defendants.
litigating

The burden on the California Defendants of
in Utah

is great

compared

to the burden of

requiring Plaintiff to litigate her claim in California. All
the witnesses in this action, except Plaintiff, reside in
California.
Moreover, the State of Utah has little interest in
adjudicating this dispute.

Of course, Plaintiff argues that

Utah has a strong interest in providing redress for tortious
injuries caused in Utah.

However, the circumstances of this

case belie that argument.

This case arises from acts done in

California

by the California

Defendants.

Likewise, the

circumstances leading up to the California Defendants' actions
arose out of criminal activity that occurred in California.
Utah's connection to this dispute is, at best, attenuated.
Thus, Plaintiff's claim should be heard in California.
20

CONCLUSION
The

California

Defendants

have

not

established

sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Utah to allow
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the

District Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for lack of
personal jurisdiction must be affirmed.

DATED this

/V"
J2±
1

day of March, 1993.

KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

^^Ct^^

/^

Gregory D. Phillips
Scott R. Ryther
Attorneys for Appellees

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellees were mailed, postage prepaid,
this

/<?'*

day of March, 1993, to the following:

M. David Eckersley, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

Gregory D. Phillips ^
Scott R. Ryther
Attorneys for Appellees
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EXHIBIT

"A"

Gregory D. Phillips, Esq. (4645)
Scott R. Ryther, Esq. (5540)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VALERIE BRYANT,

]
i AFFIDAVIT OF
i LON MORTON

Plaintiff,

vs.
LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU,
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC., and
CALIFORNIA CAPITAL SERVICES,
INC.,

]
] Civil No. 920902306CV
]
:i Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendants.
Lon Morton, being

first duly

sworn on oath, states the

following:
1.
Capital

I am the President and majority shareholder of Morton
Management,

The Morton

company,

Inc,

and

California

Capital Services {collectively referred to as the "Companies").

I

make this Affidavit based on personal Icnowledge concerning the
business dealings of myself and the Companies*
2.

I have never been a resident of Utah*

in Utah, and I have never done business in Utah.

Mor-001-vr

1

I own no property

3*

The Companies have never done business in Utah.

The

Companies have no clients in Utah, maintain no offices in Utah,
have never contracted to provide goods or services in Utah, and do
not purchase goods or services from any suppliers in Utah.

In

short, the Companies have never had any reason to be in Utah or to
deal with persons or companies in Utah.
4.

In April, 1989, plaintiff Valerie Bryant ("Plaintiff,f) ,

then a resident and citizen of California, began employment with
the Companies in the position of Controller.
5.

The

Companies

provided

officers with company-owned
expenses of the Companies.

credit

certain

of

their

corporate

cards to pay for business

Plaintiff was never an officer of any

of the Companies and was never provided with a company-owned credit
card.

However, Plaintiff was authorized to use company-owned

credit cards if needed to make incidental purchases on behalf of
the Companies.

It was understood by all officers and employees,

that the company-owned

credit cards were to be used only for

company business expenses.
6.

In January 1990, Plaintiff notified me of her intent to

move to Utah and resign her position as Controller.
7.

Because the Companies would need Plaintiff's assistance

in making the transition to a new Controller, I requested that
Plaintiff remain in her position for a while longer.

Plaintiff

agreed to continue her employment as Controller until February
1990.

Mor-001 J#T

2

8.

Before Plaintiff left California in February 1990, I

requested

that

Plaintiff

provide

further

assistance

to

the

Companies and me as we made the transition to the new Controller,
Ms. Tina Vagnoni.

while still in California, Plaintiff agreed to

work for the Companies as an independent consultant during the
upcoming transition period.
9.

Plaintiff relocated her residence to Utah immediately

after her resignation in February 1990.
10.
as

an

Plaintiff assisted the Companies on a contract basis and
independent

consultant

from

February

1990

through

approximately May 1990.
11 • All the Companies7 computer hardware and software, which
Plaintiff used in her work for the Companies, were located in the
Companies' California offices. Accordingly, Plaintiff commuted to
California from Utah to assist the Companies during the transition
period.

To my knowledge, all of Plaintiff's consulting work for

the Companies was performed at the offices of Morton Capital
Management in California*

for

12.

Soon after Plaintiff had completed her consulting work

the

Companies,

personnel

at

Morton

Capital

Management

discovered that Plaintiff had used a company-owned credit card
extensively to purchase items for her personal use. As Plaintiff's
use of the card was scrutinized more closely, employees discovered
that Plaintiff had used her position as Controller to prevent
others from discovering her personal use of the card.

Plaintiff

wrote checks from the Companies' cash accounts to pay the credit
Mor-OCljfT

3

card balance each month without anyon. .is. r.vi.wing th. charges
made.

Because nobody else reviewed the credit card charges on a

regular basis, Plaintiff's misappropriation of company funds was
not discovered until aft.r she left.
13.

Wh.n company management learned of Plaintiff. m i s u s .

of

the company credit card, I complained to law enforcement officers
in Los Angeles County, California.
14.

It is my understanding that Plaintiff was charged with

criminal theft in Los Angeles County, California, and that those
charges w.r. lat.r dismissed.

DATED this

%3

day of Jul y < 0 l99 2

LOT M o r t o n '

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b.for. m. this j±±

/

My Commission Expires:
U

;.//i ,./

,'Q

I ''. C. ,

j

Notary Public

Residing a t :

JUOYLSTANKO
COMM. #967538
NotoryPublioCotffbmia
f
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
'
Mycomm. expires JUN 10,1996

MM 00I.MT

day of July,

4

£-s fi,..

'/-

1992.

EXHIBIT

"B"

Gregory D. Phillips, Esq. (4645)
Scott R. Ryther, Esq. (5540)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VALERIE BRYANT,
AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL LANDAU

Plaintiff,
vs.
LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU,
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC., and
CALIFORNIA CAPITAL SERVICES,
INC.,

Civil No. 920902306CV
Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendants.
Michael Landau, being first duly sworn on oath, states the
following:
1.

From May 1986 until January 1991, I was employed in the

position of Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Morton
Capital Management.

While in that position, I also carried out

responsibilities for two other companies owned by Mr. Morton, The
Morton Company, Inc. and California Capital Services (all sometimes
collectively

referred

to as the

"Companies").

Affidavit based on personal knowledge.

Mor-OCe.trr

1

I make

this

2.

I have never been a resident of Utah, I own no property

in Utah, and I have never done business in Utah.
3.

During my employment with the Companies, I never had

occasion to travel to Utah for business on behalf of the Companies.
To my knowledge, the Companies have never done business in Utah,
nor have they done business with persons or companies in Utah*

DATED this

£

>

Michael Landau

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this -£*

My Commission Expires:
*-*
ninYi STANirn
COMM. #967538
Notary Public-California
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My comm. expires JUN 10.1996

Mor-0C2*fT

^U.

I

Notary Public
Residing at:

i
>

I

2

day of July, 1992

/J-l^
/ ; '•? ^-0 V . A ^

O.T;/'-<

EXHIBIT

"C"

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHT
M. David Eckersley (0956)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VALERIE BRYANT,
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU,
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC.,
and CALIFORNIA CAPITAL
SERVICES, INC.,

Civil No. 920902306CV
Judge

James S. Sawaya

Defendants.

Plaintiff Valerie Bryant alleges as follows for her
cause of action against defendants:
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah.
2.

Defendants Lon Morton and Michael Landau are

individuals residing in Calabassa, California.
3.

Defendants Morton Capital Management, The Morton

Company, Inc. and California Capital Services, Inc. are
ICE, YEATES
iEUKAHlEft
intrtl.SuittOOO
tt Fourth South
It U k t City
Jtah 84111
1)524-1000

California corporations which are related entities having
common ownership and in which Lon Morton is a principal.
4.

In April of 1989, plaintiff was hired by Lon

Morton to provide services for each of the corporate defendants
named above.

She was given the title of Controller of Morton

Capital Management, Inc., and its related entities.

Mr. Morton

agreed, in the presence of defendant Landau, that plaintiff
would be compensated at the rate of $6,000.00 per month, with
$4,000.00 per month to be paid in cash and plaintiff being
authorized to charge $2,000.00 per month on various credit
cards issued to the corporate defendants.
5.

Between April of 1989 and January of 1990,

plaintiff performed services for the corporate defendants.

In

January of 1990, she resigned from her position and informed
Mr. Morton of her impending move to Utah.
6.

Mr. Morton persuaded plaintiff to continue her

employment until the end of February, 1990.

Following her

relocation to Utah, Ms. Bryant continued to provide contract
services to defendants at the request of defendant Morton until
May of 1990.
7.

Following plaintiff's termination of her

relationship with defendants, Mr. Morton and Mr. Landau began
making false accusations that plaintiff had misappropriated

funds from the corporate defendants in an effort to damage her
reputation and credibility with regulators of the defendants1
business operations.
8.

Defendants Morton and Landau, acting with malice

towards plaintiff, initiated a prosecution against plaintiff,
who they knew to be living in Utah, by means of false
statements and perjured testimony.
9.

Criminal charges of felony theft were brought in

Los Angeles County, State of California, against plaintiff as a
direct result of the actions of defendants Morton and Landau
acting on behalf of the corporate defendants.

A warrant of

arrest was issued in California and plaintiff was ultimately
arrested in Salt Lake County, State of Utah in January of 1991
and held to answer the false charges filed in California.
10.

As a direct and proximate result of the malicious

prosecution initiated by the defendants, plaintiff incurred in
excess of $25,000.00 in expenses associated in legal fees and
travel costs, suffered emotional distress and general damages
and was injured in her reputation.
11.

Following further investigation by the office of

the prosecuting attorney, wherein the falsity of the
defendants' allegations was revealed, charges against plaintiff
were dismissed by the Court on motion of the prosecution in
September of 1991.
<CI, YIATIf
ilOZAHltft
•ntrtl,Sultt900
tt Fourth South
It U k t City
Nth 84111
1)524-1000

-3-

WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that judgment be entered
against each defendant for an amount established by the
evidence to fully compensate her for her special and general
damages, plus an additional amount in punitive damages to
adequately punish defendants for their intentional and
malicious misconduct.
DATED this

33

day of

hb*jjL

, 1992.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

^JnjLdJL
M. Dafvid Eckers
Attorneys for P l a i
P l a i n t i f f ' s Address:
1291 E. Earl Way
Sandy, Utah 84070
1565d

-4-

ADDENDUM

Gregory D. Phillips, Esq. (4645)
Scott R. Ryther, Esq. (5540)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VALERIE BRYANT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

i ORDER GRANTING MOTION
I TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
;I PERSONAL JURISDICTION

LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU,
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC., and
CALIFORNIA CAPITAL SERVICES,
INC.,

j
)
) Civil No. 920902306CV
)
]1 Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendants.
The

defendants' Motion

to Dismiss

for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction was submitted to the Court pursuant to a Notice to
Submit for Decision dated August 11, 1992.
The
supporting
plaintiff

Court,

having

affidavits
Valerie

reviewed

filed

Bryant

has

by

the
the

failed

written
parties,

memoranda
concludes

and
that

to carry her burden of

demonstrating that any of the defendants in this case can be
subjected to the jurisdiction of this Court consistent with their
rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly,
the Court hereby orders as follows:
Mor-007.trr

1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants' "Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Personal-Jurisdiction" against plaintiff Valerie Bryant
is GRANTED, and the complaint of Plaintiff Valerie Bryant filed
herein is hereby DISMISSED.

DATED this

* * -

day of September /l?92.

The ¥Lop6rable James S.^Sawaya
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

Mof-007irr

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing proposed Order Granting Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal

Jurisdiction

was hand

delivered

September, 1992, to the following:
M. David Eckersley
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

M©f-007.srr

3

this

A

day of

>

a

•JCTZI
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
M. David Eckersley (0956)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000

•, v.
r i* 'it

** *

/

-u

/ ,- *"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VALERIE BRYANT,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU,
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC., and
CALIFORNIA CAPITAL SERVICES,
INC.,

Civil No. 920902306CV
Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendants.

Plaintiff Valerie Bryant hereby gives notice, pursuant
to the provisions of Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, that she is taking an appeal of the Order
of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing her Complaint,
which Order was entered on September 23, 1992, to the Utah
Supreme Court.
DATED this

Jil

day of

Oat_

, 1992.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
CC, YCATES
EUKAHLEft
itrti. SulttMO
.1 Fourth South
I Lako City
tan M m
U24.1000

BV n

IL.JC,AJL

M. Dav/id Eckersley^
Attorneys for Pla intifff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that, on the 2 A

day of Octooer,

1992, I caused to oe mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following:
Gregory D. Pnillips, Esq.
Scott R. Ryther, Esq.
KIMBALL, PARR, tfADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

1912d

', YtATIS
3ZAHLIH
• I, Suit* 000
:
ourth $o«tn
*k« City
) 84111
>241000
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